Jesse W. Campbell, Oscar Radyan Danar
Reducing corruption in developing countries requires delegating policy implementation to bureaucrats who lack strong incentives to undermine policy outcomes for personal gain. However, despite universal disdain for corruption and strong anti-corruption laws in virtually all developing countries, corruption prevails. Drawing on credible commitment theory and institutional theory, this study argues that elites seeking a favorable legal environment in which to perpetuate corruption will publicly support anti-corruption policy to secure popular legitimacy. However, the same elites will selectively overturn strategic components of the anti-corruption framework which prevent them from intervening in public decision-making processes at critical moments. We illustrate this theory by drawing on three examples from Indonesia: recent actions taken to undermine local autonomy, the weakening of the Corruption Eradication Commission, and the dissolution of the Civil Service Commission. By integrating our theoretical model with empirical cases, we provide compelling evidence for how elites weaken popular anti-corruption reform. © 2025 American Society for Public Administration.
Incheon National University, South Korea; Brawijaya University, Indonesia
